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DISCUSSION ARTICLE I: 
St. Thomas's De Trinitate, Q. 5, A. 2 Ad 3: A Reply 
To John Knasas 
by Mark F. Johnson 
In his recent paper in the Angelicum, John Knasas provides 
us with his view as to when, and under which conditions, the 
wisdom of metaphysics may take its start.1 He presents four 
representative positions on this topic, which he then investigates, 
thereafter adopting one of them as, in his view, the correct position. 
One of the positions which Knasas presents and investigates, but 
which he does not adopt, is the "natural philosophy approach'' , 
an approach represented by the late James A. Weisheipl, O.P., who 
stated it in print some twelve years ago.2 
The natural philosophy approach, it will be recalled, goes some­
thing like this. In order to complete a general science of nature, 
the natural philosopher must establish the cause of motion, since 
ens mobile is the subject of natural philosophy, and no thing is 
known fully if its cause is not known. In seeking the cause of 
motion the natural philosopher discovers that there is a first cause 
of motion which is wholly separate from matter: the unmoved 
mover. This new knowledge, the result of a demonstration quia 
through a non-convertible effect, tells us that not all being is 
i John Knasas, " Immateriality and Metaphysics", Angelicum 65 
(1988), 44-76, to be cited hereafter as Knasas, followed by the appropriate 
page numbers. 
2 James .A. Weisheipl, O. P., "The Relationship of Medieval Natural 
Philosophy to Modern Science: The Contribution of Thomas .Aquinas to 
Its Understanding", Manuscripta 20 ( 1976), pp. 181-196. This essay, 
together with ten other of Father Weisheipl's major essays on natural 
philosophy, has been republished by Catholic University Press in a volume 
entitled Nature and Motion in the Mid4le Ages (Washington, 1985). I 
shall eite this article in its republished form, retitled " Medieval Natural 
Philosophy and Modern Science", which is chapter XI in this volume, 
pp. 261-276. 
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material, and thus tells us that there is a place for a science whose 
subject is being, not considered as mobile, but as such: ens inquan­
tum ens. This science is called metaphysics.3 
Knasas's response to the natural philosophy approach is quick 
and pointed, for he denies outright what would be the minor 
premise of the natural philosophy approach. Even if it is true that 
the science which discovers the immaterial sets the stage for meta­
physics, natural philosophy is not that science, for it does not 
attain to the immaterial. As Knasas sees it, "Aquinas restricts 
philosophical knowledge of God and the angels together to meta­
physics. Both are known only in metaphysics." 4 The reason 
Knasas is convinced that St. Thomas restricts the immaterial to 
metaphysics is because he finds "no Thomistic texts that une­
quivocally give natural philosophy a demonstration of the im­
material." 5 To support this claim, Knasas cites St. Thomas's 
In Boethii de Trinitate, question 5, article 2 and 3. While this text 
speaks of natural philosophy's prime mover, its primus motor, 
it does not speak of it as God, or, Knasas thinks, even as .imma­
terial. It is "of a different nature from natural things,'? and is. 
simply the end to which natural pholosophy leads.6 
All the same, and without wishing to enter into the broader 
discussion of the priority of physics to metaphysics, I find much 
more in this text than Knasas does. In fact, I think its real mean­
ing is opposed to that given it by Knasas. The following, I hope, 
will make this clear. 
s Cf. Weisheipl,. op. cit., p. 274. See also Ralph Mcinerny Being and, 
Predication: Thomistic Interpretations (Washington, 1986), ch. 3, "The 
Prime Mover and the Order of Learning", pp. 49-57; William H. Kane, 
O.P., Approach to Philosophy: lillements of Thomism (Washington, 1962), 
ch. 7, "The Subject of Metaphysics", pp. 161-179; Thomas c. O'Brien, 
O.P., Metaphysics and, the Jila:istence of God (Washington, 1960). It should 
be said that the present article is a sketch, and that the authors cited 
provide more detailed accounts in the works cited. In addition, there may 
be variations among those who take this view as to the different stages 
involved in such a process. 
4 Knasas, p. 50. Knasas has very kindly given me a typescript of his 
article "Ad Mentem Thomae: Does Natural Philosophy Prove God?", 
soon to appear in Divus Thomas; this article reiterates the position he 
takes here. 
5 Knasas, ibidem. 
a Knasas, ibidem. 
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The fifth and sixth questions of St. Thomas's Expositio super 
librum Boethii de Trinitate are treatments of the three speculative 
sciences, natural philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics. 7 Both 
questions arise from the comments made by Boethius in the second 
chapter of his De Trinitate, where he speaks of the number, objects 
and methods of the speculative sciences. St. Thomas accordingly 
treats of the number and objects of the sciences in question 5, 
while relegating the treatment of their method to question 6. 
The first of the three speculative sciences, Boethius points out, 
is natural philsophy, which considers what is in motu, inabstracta. 
In addition, that which the naturalis considers habetque motum 
forma materiae coniuncta [e],8 In his expositio textus St. Thomas 
explains what we should understand Boethius to mean by this: 
Quod autem dicit: habetque motum forma materiae coniuncta, sic 
intelligendum est: ipsum compositum ex materia et forma, in quan­
tum huiusmodi, habet motum sibi debitum, vel ipsa forma in materia 
existens est principium motus; et ideo eadem est consideratio de 
rebus secundum quod sunt materiales et secundum quod sunt 
mobiles.9 
Material things, composites of matter and form, are all subject to 
motion; whoever considers the one, must consider the other. The 
upshot of all this is that the subject of the natural philosopher, 
the naturalis, is in motu, inabstracta; he considers what is in matter 
and motion, not what is removed or abstracted ( inabstracta). But 
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, E:epositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, ed. 
B. Decker (Leiden, 1965), pp. 161-229. With the Leonine text still in the 
offing (which will be found in Vol. 50), this remains the best available 
edition, but note the corrigenda et addenda on pp. 244-245. All citations 
will be taken from this edition and cited according to the standard form. 
Page and line numbers will be given when necessary. Fr. A. Maurer, 
C.S.B. has translated these two question into English as The Divisions 
and Methods of the Sciences, 4th revised edition, (Toronto, 1986). 
s Boethius, De Trinitate, chap. 2, as found in St. Thomas's In Boethii 
de Trinitate, p. 157, 11. 5, 8. I suggest the dropping of the " e " in 
coniunctae because both the Latin syntax and the context of Boethius's 
text seem to require it. Also, the lemma which St. Thomas gives before 
he himself comments upon this passage has " habetque motum forma 
materiae coiuncta ". Cf. p. 159, I. 16. 
9 De Trin., e:epositio secundi capituli, p. 159, 11. 15-19. Because the 
discussion at hand concerns the precise meaning of certain texts, I have 
taken the liberty of quoting the latin text throughout this article. 
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is this really true? Does the natural philosopher deal with what is 
in matter and motion? The second article of quesion 5 asks just 
this question, and it is in this context that we find the ad tertium 
which I see as containing a doctrine quite different from that sug­
gested by Knasas. 
There are seven objections to the question "utrum naturalis 
philosophio sit de his quae sunt in motu et materia?". Some of 
the objections look upon matter's characteristic of constant change 
as a source of the absolute unintelligibility of material things. 
One objection argues that since matter is the principle of individu­
ation, and since no science deals with individuals, natural philos­
ophy does not deal with matter. Furthermore, another argues, 
whatever is in motion is contingent, and if science is of what is 
necessary, then how can there be a science of what is in motion? 
Our own objection, the third, has a slightly different attack: 
Praeterea, in scientia naturali agitur de primo motore, ut patet in 
viii Physicorum. Sed ipse est immunis ah omni materia. Ergo 
scientia naturalis non est de his solis quae sunt in materia.10 
This argument presents a serious difficulty for one who would 
maintain that natural philosophy does concern itself with what 
is in matter and in motion. An integral approach to Aristotle's 
work the Physics would indicate that the natural philosopher 
deals with the prime mover, which, the objector claims, is totally 
removed from matter: immunis ab omni materia. The claim that 
natural philosophy deals with what is in matter and in motion is 
false then, if it is intended to mean that natural philosophy deals 
only with beings of this kind. 
As usual, St. Thomas dedicates his responsio to solving the basic 
difficulty that this question poses, which he does by detailing the 
character of abstraction of the universal from the particular, which 
in turn allows for knowledge of a nature whose existence in rerum 
natura is always accompanied by the individuating conditions of 
matter. St. Thomas thereafter responds to the various objections, 
and responds to our third objection in its course. It would seem 
that the simplest response St. Thomas could make to this objection 
would be that natural philosophy does not attain to a prime mover 
which is immaterial at all: nego minorem. Indeed, if St. Thomas's 
10 St. Thomas, In de Trim., q. 5, a. 2 obj. 3, p. 174, 11. 7-9. 
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goal were to defend the claim that natural philosophy deals only 
with things that are material and in motion, he would seem bound 
to deny the claim of the objector. In short, if St. Thomas truly 
thinks that the natural philosopher does not attain to a knowledge 
of an immaterial reality, then he has before him the perfect oppor­
tunity for making his teaching on this matter clear. And yet, 
St. Thomas does not do this. In fact, in no part of his reply does 
St. Thomas come close to contradicting the objection's claim that 
the naturalis considers the immaterial. 
Ad tertium dicendum quod de primo motore non agitur in scientia 
naturali tamquam de subiecto vel de parte subiecti, sed tamquam de 
termino ad quern scientia naturalis perducit. Terminus autem non 
est de natura rei, cuius est terminus, sed habet aliquam habitudinern 
ad rem illarn, sicut terminus lineae non est linea, sed habet ad earn 
aliquam habitudinem, ita etiam et primus motor est alterius naturae 
a rebus naturalibus, habet tamen ad eas aliquam habitudinem, in 
quantum influit eis motum, et sic cadit in consideratione naturalis, 
scilicet non secundum ipsum, sed in quantum est motor.11 
We should first of all point out what St. Thomas does not say. 
He does not say that the naiilra.lis does not consider a prime mover, 
nor does he say that the prime mover is not immaterial. Further­
more, St. Thomas does not see the objection as a hypothetical pro­
posal to which he feels bound to offer a hypothetical reply. His 
response is not one of data, non concesso; the conditional conjunc­
tion si is found nowhere in the ad tertium, nor is any verb in the 
subjunctive mood. St. Thomas simply does not contradict the 
objection. 
What the text rather seems to indicate is that St. Thomas grants 
outright the claim of the objection and then sets out to explain 
how he can both grant the objector's claim and maintain at the 
same time an affirmative answer to the initial question of the 
article. Dato et concesso that the prime mover which the natural 
philosopher considers is free from all matter ( immunis ab omni 
materia), how can this be reconciled with the claim that natural 
philosophy considers what is in matter and motion? Since St. 
Thomas himself points out that the prime mover is " of another 
nature from natural things" (primus motor est alterius naturae 
u St. Thomas, In de Trin., q. 5, a. 2 ad 3, pp. 177-178, 11. 26-36. 
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a rebus naturalibus), the prime mover cannot be the subject or part 
of the subject of natural philosophy; de primo motore non agitur 
in scientia naturali tamquam de subiecto vel de parte subiecti . • . 
If natural philosophy is to deal with this immaterial prime mover 
at all, then, it will do so only in virtue of its subject's having a 
per se relationship to this prime mover. This is, of course, the 
very way in which St. Thomas proceeds. 
The prime mover, while immaterial, is the starting-point of the 
motion of material things. St. Thomas's illustration of the point 
of a line, while not mentioned by Knasas, is very useful here, for 
the infinite regress argument in the Physics has a very linear 
character; just as moved movers lead to an unmoved mover as to 
that from which they proceed as movers, so too does a finite line 
lead to a point as to that from which it proceeds. In both cases the 
terminus is of a different nature from that which proceeds from it; 
the prime mover is altogether immobile, even per accidens,12 and 
is immaterial,13 and the point is position without extension, and 
the line is length (extension) without width.14 Both termini, how­
ever much " of another nature " they may be as to their respective 
terminati, are nonetheless necessary to an investigation which 
proposes to treat of these things which are, in fact, terminati; 
moved movers are not fully understood without knowledge of an 
unmoved mover, and finite lines are not understood without their 
two points, the principles of their finitude. It is precisely because 
of this that St. Thomas thinks he can both grant the immateriality 
of natural philosophy's prime mover and maintain that natural 
philosophy deals with that which is in motu, inabstracta; the prime 
mover, although immaterial, and although the occasion for further 
and perhaps much more fulfilling discussion, is nonetheless the 
first cause of the motion which is the prime consideration of the 
natural philosopher, for by the influx of motion into natural things 
it establishes a relationship, a habitudo, between itself and things 
whose natures are so markedly different from its own: et sic cadit 
in consideratione naturalis, scilicet non secundum ipsum, sed in 
quantum est motor. 
12 Cf. St. Thomas, In VIII Physicorum, ed. Maggiolo ( Taurini, 1965), 
lect. 12, nos. 1073-1074. 
13 Cf. ibidem, lect. 23. 
14 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, 85, 8 ad 2. 
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To sum up. The intelligibility of St. Thomas's ad tertium in 
question 5, article 2, of his Expositio super Boethii de Trinitate 
depends upon our seeing that he both grants outright the claim 
of the third objection that the prime mover which the natural 
philosopher considers is, in fact, immaterial, and that he devotes 
the entire ad tertium to explaining not whether the natural philos­
opher deals with the immaterial, but how it happens that in dealing 
with the immaterial he remains a natural philosopher. Since the 
existence of the immaterial could hardly be a starting operative 
principle for the natural philosopher, and since the objection's 
reference is to the eighth book of the Physics, where Aristotle is 
proceeding by way of demonstration, it seems a fair inference that 
St. Thomas would say that the natural philosopher's ability to speak 
of an immaterial prime mover would be the result of a demon­
stration had properly within the boundaries of his science, and 
thus for St. Thomas, at least in this early work (written between 
1252-1259) ,15 natural philosophy does demonstrate the existence 
of the immaterial. And assuming that St. Thomas continues to 
hold that the eighth book of the Physics is natural philosophy, 
and there is no reason to doubt this, 16 it would seem that he main­
tains that natural philosophy demonstrates the immaterial late 
in his life as well.11 
15 The dating is that of Father Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: 
His Life, Thought and Work (Washington, 1983), pp. 381-382, 438. 
16 St. Thomas concludes his commentary on the Physics with the fol­
lowing: " Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de 
rebus naturalibus in primo principio totius naturae, qui est super omnia 
Deus benedietus in saecula. Amen." In VIII Physicorum, lect. 23, no. 
1172 (my italics). 
11 "Probatum est in octavo Physicorum, quod cum non sit abire in 
infinitum in moventibus et motis, oportet devenire in aliquod primum 
movens immobile: quia et si deveniatur in aliquod movens seipsum, 
iterum ex hoc oportet devenire in aliquod movens immobile, ut ibi pro­
batum est" In XII Metaphysicorum, ed. Spiazzi (Taurini, 1964), lect. 
6, no. 2517; ".Antiqui enim non opinabantur aliquam substantiam esse 
praeter substantiam corpoream mobilem, de qua physicus tractat . . . 
Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi: cum probatum sit in octavo Phy­
sicorum esse aliquod ens immobile" In IV Meta., lect. 5, no. 593; See 
also ibid., lect. 13, no. 690; lect. 17, no. 748. Fr. Weisheipl dates the 
commentary on the Physics as 1270-1271, and the commentary on the 
Metaphysics as 1269-1272. See his }l'riar Thomas, pp. 375-376, 379, 482. 
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The minor premise of the "natural philosophy approach" remains 
standing, and Thomists who value this approach can, I think, look 
with confidence to the ad tertium of St. Thomas's commentary on 
the De Trinitate for support. The major premise, however, namely 
that the science which discovers the immaterial sets the stage for 
metaphysics, poses other questions. 
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